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ABSTRACT
The everyday use of hydrogen in the transport sector
requires high safety standards. Safety requirements
must be addressed as a key issue for fuel cell car
development. Therefore, it becomes crucial to have
experimental data on hand in order to provide realistic
and reliable risk assessment and to be able to really
know the extent of safety margins taken. In such a
context, the National Institute of Industrial Environment
and Risks (INERIS) along with the French Atomic
Energy Commission (CEA), the French automotive
manufacturer PSA PEUGEOT CITROËN and the
research Institute on unstable phenomena (IRPHE)
recently started a research programme entitled DRIVE.
This programme aims at providing experimental and
numerical results for the safe design of hydrogen
vehicles. Fields of investigation cover the whole range of
phenomena that can be encountered in hydrogen
accidents, from leakage to dispersion, ignition and finally
combustion. The work programme and early results are
presented in this article.
INTRODUCTION
The everyday use of hydrogen in the transport sector
requires high safety standards. Safety requirements
must be addressed as a key issue for fuel cell car
development. It is therefore a necessity to fully
understand and investigate explosion and fire hazards
associated with the use of hydrogen and to come up
with practical and realistic means to control these
hazards. Although the experience and safety record of
hydrogen as an industrial gas is significant, it turns out
not to be applicable to the future decentralised use of
moderate quantities of hydrogen. Data specific to that
use are becoming crucial in order to provide realistic risk
assessment and to be able to specify expected safety
performances.
PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES
This project which gathers together industrial expertise
of the car manufacturer PSA PEUGEOT CITROËN as
well as technical and scientific skills of CEA, IRPHE and
the co-ordinator INERIS aims at providing experimental
and numerical results to better assess hazards when
handling hydrogen onboard vehicles. Results will
contribute to strengthen risk assessment studies in
terms of hazard quantification as well as to propose
innovative solutions for the handling of hydrogen in cars
compatible with public use.
The work programme is split into 4 items: the automotive
system, hydrogen dispersion, hydrogen ignition and
combustion and finally results dissemination. The
second and the third items focus on the hazardous
phenomena one would consecutively encounter when
dealing with hydrogen accidents. The accidental chain is
illustrated by the figure below.
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The list below indicates some of the safety challenges
that face car manufacturers:
• Safe pressurised storage design (thermal insulation,
use and location of pressure relief devices (PRD),
enclosed or open compartment for storage...) and
location of the pressurised storage in order to
prevent burst due to thermal and mechanical
aggressions as well as to control consequences of
accidental leakage or PRD releases.
• Adequate control of standing flames fed by minor
undetected leaks,
• Appropriate equipment design (choice of material
and technology) and location (segregation,,
enclosure,...) in order to control ignition sources
whether mechanical, electrical or electrostatic in
normal operations,
• Safe handling of hydrogen purged outside vehicle,
• Effective control of explosive atmospheres in
confined or semi-confined spaces on-board vehicles
(engine compartment) or outside the vehicle
(underbody, garages...). That also includes ensuring
that hydrogen will never penetrates into the
passenger compartment.
Aside from the items above, one of the great challenges
consists in setting an appropriate limit to segregate
tolerable accidental releases versus unacceptable ones.
Such a limit would contribute to set the expected
performance of the leak detection and leak interruption
systems whether based on atmospheric detection or on
direct measurement such as flow or pressure drop.
Ideally, a vehicle should be able to run without leak
detection systems having in mind that reliability of such
detection system is so far moderate and that
maintenance is rather constraining. Chronic leakage is
also an issue since the no-leak objective does not seem
to be realistic. Therefore, upper tolerable limit should
also be specified for chronic leakage along with design
measures to ensure that hydrogen can never
accumulate to form an explosive mixture.
Finally, CFD tools currently and intensively used by car
manufacturers to design vehicles (aerodynamic studies
for instance) should also be able to provide reliable
results when computing normal or accidental release
scenarios for hydrogen vehicles.
Safe design practices should finally be shared among
manufacturers to promote the high safety standard
expected for the public use of hydrogen.
DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE WORK
PROGRAMME AND EARLY RESULTS
WORK PROGRAMME
This project started early 2006 in the framework of the
first call for proposals of the National Research Agency
(ANR). It will last for three years. Its work programme is
made of 4 main modules:
• vehicle safety,
• hydrogen release and dispersion,
• hydrogen ignition and combustion (explosion or jet
flame),
• and finally results compilation and dissemination.
The vehicle safety module includes a thorough risk
assessment in order to identify hazardous situations
(causes, consequences). Outputs from this module will
shape the content of the experimental and modelling
work in terms of hazardous situations to investigate with
the objective of obtaining better quantification and
therefore better risk assessment and risk control. The
vehicle safety module that concentrates on hydrogen
equipment and potential ignition sources onboard
vehicles goes down to component level.
Within the hydrogen release and dispersion module, we
will then experimentally look at hydrogen component
leakage in order to quantify them. Both chronic and
accidental hydrogen leakage, as well as hydrogen
emissions (purges, pressure relief systems) will be
considered. These values will then serve as references
to build the test matrix for hydrogen releases (free and
impinged) on board the vehicle as well as in confined
spaces.
These release experiments will be carried out with
helium as well as with hydrogen. The size and location
of explosive atmospheres will be monitored for various
leaking rate and location.
Within the third module, we will concentrate on hydrogen
ignition with vehicle components as well on hydrogen
combustion (flame or explosion). Ignition potentiality of
car components (fans, electronic cards, electric engines,
braking systems...) will be investigated through practical
testing. In parallel, explosion experiments will be
undertaken in order to assess the destructive potential of
explosive atmospheres (in accordance with hydrogen
dispersion findings) in more or less obstructed
environments. In a later stage, combustion tests will take
place on board vehicles. Hydrogen flames will also be
considered at two different scales; on one hand, effect of
large hydrogen flame resulting for instance from a PRD
release and on the other hand, standing flames fed by
minor leaks. For the latter point we will look at the ease
with which ignition can occur as well as flame
sustainability depending on upstream pressure and
leaking orifice size. Excessive fire hazards due to the
use of hydrogen can possibly be more critical than
explosive atmospheres themselves that concentrate
most of today's concerns. In the frame of the last
module, experimental learning will be turned into
practical graphs to facilitate risk quantification.
Recommendations on best practices for vehicle design
will also be drafted. Topics such as maximum allowable
explosive volume, control of ignition sources and
location of hydrogen components... will be addressed in
final public reports. Results will be discussed during
dedicated seminars.
This project will not investigate the safety of high-
pressure hydrogen storage in terms of potentiality for
catastrophic failure when exposed to mechanical
aggression or external fire. Issues such as fuse location
on tanks or thermal insulation will not be looked at in the
frame of this project. However, potential leaks as well as
PRD releases consequences (explosive atmosphere
under vehicle, jet fire) will be experimentally considered.
Leakage during refuelling will not be considered either.
More detailed content and progress of some of the work
themes is given below.
WORK TOPICS
Objectives, methodology, tools, basic background
information and early results will be presented for each
of the topics below:
1. vehicle risk assessment,
2. leak quantification,
3. hydrogen dispersion on board and outside the
vehicle,
4. hydrogen ignition by vehicle components,
5. hydrogen explosion,
6. & hydrogen flames.
VEHICLE RISK ASSESSMENT
OBJECTIVE
Risk assessment helps to evaluate and demonstrate
through a systematic and consistent approach that a
hydrogen vehicle whether of a prototypic or a series
production type is as safe as a conventional one. Within
this project this early work will help us to select
hazardous situations to be studied and therefore to
shape the experimental programme.
STEPS
Usual risk assessment steps are the following:
• identify unwanted events and associated causes
and consequences,
• e va I u ate th e i r criti city,
• and take appropriate actions to bring risk down to an
acceptable level.
TOOLS
Four tools are mainly used to contribute to the risk
assessment studies: functional analysis preliminary risk
analysis, fault trees and then Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA).
First of all, a functional analysis was undertaken. It helps
to identify system functions and associated internal and
external constrains. Then a preliminary risk assessment
was carried out. This simple methodology helps to
highlight the most unwanted events and to initiate
discussions on severity and severity levels. For each
vehicle mode (running, stand by, maintenance...) the
following unwanted events are investigated:
• shift in internal system functions and system
constrains,
• impact from the system on its environment,
• and finally, impact from the environment on the
studied system.
All identified unwanted events were then ranked
according to severity criteria. The severity scale consists
of four levels. The highest ones 4 and 3 are those further
considered in the study. Level 4 is associated with death
or injury on people and level 3 means that the vehicle
can no longer be used because of a break down. Level 3
and 4 unwanted events were then further investigated
using the fault tree methodology. This graphical
methodology helps to visualise steps and failure
combinations that lead to the top unwanted event.
Finally, a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) was
carried out. This systematic and inductive methodology
helps:
• to assess consequences of component failures (loss
or alteration of associated function) on the vehicle
and its user,
• to identify component failure modes that can impact
safety,
• and finally to propose corrective safety actions in the
course of the design process.
A typical FMEA table similar to the one used in the
project is pictured below:
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Table 1: FMEA table used in the risk assessment
process
EARLY RESULTS
Identified unwanted events when using hydrogen
onboard vehicle include:
• fire onboard vehicles,
• explosive atmospheres and ignition wherever
onboard or outside the vehicle,
• the burst of the pressurised tank,
• high pressure jets.
All the selected unwanted events are linked either with
the use of hydrogen or with the handling of pressurised
gas. Unwanted events associated with high voltage or
other non specific hazards are not considered in this
programme.
LEAK QUANTIFICATION
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this task consists in experimentally
measuring chronic and accidental leak rates (external
aggression, human error...) associated with key
components of the hydrogen feed line and the hydrogen
conversion system. Accidental leaking rates to be
evaluated include likely situation such as bad fitting
(insufficient clamping), erroneous fitting, missing or
damaged sealant. Ageing will be looked at through
repeated dismantling of hydrogen connections. Leak
caused by organic failures of components (quality
issues, internal ageing) quantification will be forwarded
to component manufacturers. Design related hydrogen
emissions (PEMFC purge, PRV...) will also be taken into
consideration. Investigated pressures will cover the full
range from the 700 bar working pressure for the high-
pressure line down to few bars for the hydrogen
conversion system. Both hydrogen and helium gas will
be used in order to assess the appropriateness to use
helium for leak quantification.
These realistic and practical figures gained from these
tests will serve as input parameters for further hydrogen
dispersion and combustion experiments. These values
will also be of a great help for risk assessment studies.
STEPS
The study includes four main steps. The first one
consists in extracting and referencing leak scenarios
from the risk assessment study. The next one will
consist in selecting components and test conditions
(pressure, damage free / damaged equipment).
Selection criteria include for instance likelihood and
severity of leak, lack of data from manufacturers or gas
component not initially designed for hydrogen use. Then,
tests will be carried out with the experimental set up
shown further down. Finally results will be recorded and
analysed.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
(Cfcp1 [2]) with an average value around 10-20 g/min. It
is interesting to notice that these values vary in a large
domain. Besides, except for the BMW tests, there is not
any obvious link between investigated cases and
specific component leakage.
Regarding component leakage the Cfcp document
indicates that the fill up point and the pressure relief
point are considered as the only way for the hydrogen
tank to leak out. As far as other components are
concerned, the pressure regulator, piping and fittings
were considered as components able to leak out
whatever the operating pressure (high-pressure and
low-pressure). The value of 20 CFM (12.77g/min),
referenced in this document, is based on the assumption
that that the onboard computer is capable of shutting
down hydrogen flow upon receiving a signal detecting a
flow larger than 20 CFM when the engine is off. The
Japanese regulation for hydrogen vehicle2 proposes a
leak threshold of 11,8 g/min (or 131 L/min) that should
not be reached in case of leakage after vehicle collision.
This leakage is assumed to have the same calorific
value as today's admissible value for gasoline. However,
associated explosive atmosphere and consequences
have not been taken into consideration. The same
document indicates that helium can be used instead of
hydrogen for leak tests as long as a 1.33 multiplication
factor of the leak volumetric flow is used.
Regarding purge management, the Japanese regulation
indicates also that no purged gas in excess of 4% of
hydrogen concentration shall be discharged or leaked to
the atmosphere.
As far as the GRPE Informal Group on Hydrogen/Fuel
Cell Vehicles work is concerned [3], no maximum
allowable leakage value or leakage value to be detected
is proposed.
The work carried out in the framework of the DRIVE
project will propose some realistic data specific to
hydrogen components and hydrogen fittings. These data
will enrich somehow empirical data proposed so far.
TOOLS
Components will be connected to pressure sources
according to the figure below. Components will be
placed inside a closed 2 m3 insulated sphere inside
where both pressure and temperature are monitored.
Component leak rate measurement is directly linked to
pressure variation inside the sphere.
Literature shows that various vehicles related leak rates
have been investigated in the frame of dispersion
experiments. As shown in table 2, these investigated
rates vary from 0.5 g/min (BMW [1]) up to 100 g/min 1 California Fuel Cell Partnership
2
 Attachment 100 - Technical standard for fuel systems
of motor vehicles fueled by compressed hydrogen gas
Temperature Openinq 2
Opening 1
Hydrogen
compressor
(700 bar)
Pressure
transducer
Pressure transducer
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Purae line
Temperature
Figure 1: Experimental set up for leak quantification
EARLY RESULTS
At least, the following components will be tested:
hydrogen connections, pressure regulator, phase
separator, hydrogen pump, solenoid valve &
components made of polymeric or plastic type materials.
HYDROGEN DISPERSION ON BOARD AND
OUTSIDE VEHICLE (CONFINED SPACES)
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are to investigate,
experimentally and numerically, different types of leaks
and the dispersion of hydrogen either inside the vehicle
or outside the vehicle in the most critical situation, that is
when the vehicle is parked in an enclosed space such
as a private garage. The mechanisms for the build-up of
a potentially explosive mixture of hydrogen and air will
be studied in detail, and effects of confinement and
ventilation will be assessed.
STEPS
The experimental programme will consist of leak and
dispersion tests in a full-scale garage as well as on-
board a vehicle. Both helium and hydrogen will be used.
The test matrix will be elaborated from the leak
quantification tests, the preliminary risk assessment
study, and some pretest calculations using CFD
(Computational Fluid Dynamics) codes will be performed
to optimise the instrumentation set-up (location, number
of sensors). After the tests have been performed, the
CFD tools will be validated on a series of experiments,
including some involving passive or active ventilation.
Finally, the CFD tools will be used to perform parametric
studies and to identify worse case scenarios and how
they can be mitigated (for example by design of passive
or active ventilation).
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The table below summarises past hydrogen leak
hypotheses and dispersion experiments in confined
spaces.
Data
source
Swain
garage -
1998 [4] &
[5]
Swain
hallway -
1999 [6}
California
fuel cell
Partnershi
p - July
2004 [2]
JARI [7]
BMW
tests [1]
Motor
Vehicle
Fire
Research
Institute
USA [8]
Experimental
configuration and
objectives
Assess how should
existing garages be
modified to make
them suitable for H2
vehicles
CFD validation
The objective was to
numerically
evaluate
consequences
(explosive
atmosphere volume)
of hydrogen leakage
in confined
environment such as
garages.
Two undercarriage
configurations
considered
Examine the
diffusion behaviour
of hydrogen in an
enclosed space with
various release
speed Hydrogen
was released
continuously from
the center of the box
bottom surface
BMW wanted to
experimentally
demonstrate that
maximum leakage in
a confined room
(garage) would not
induce hazardous
explosive
atmosphere with
minimum natural
ventilation.
Assess
consequences of
hydrogen released if
ignited in the vehicle
underbody as well
as in the engine
compartment
Leak rate
proposed or
investigated in
g/min
10.2 g/min
4.8 g/min
Residential
garages : 5, 15,
20 CFM leak
(respectively
12.77, 38.30 and
51.07 g/mn) &
Maintenance and
service facilities :
continuous 24
and 36 CFM leak
(respectively
61.29 and 91.93
g/mn)
0,84 g/min or 10
L/min
1 g/min
0.5 g/min
48 g/min & 24
g/min through a
1.6 mm orifice
nozzle
Remarks
Low exit velocity (0.1 m/s)
Low exit velocity (0.1 m/s)
The assumption is that the
on-board computer is
capable of shutting down
hydrogen flow upon
receiving a signal detecting
a flow larger than 20 cubic
feet per minute (CFM) flow,
'leak', when the vehicle is
dormant. This leak rate
corresponds to a fuel cell
power output of about 50
kW
It was found that with
change in release speed
(0.1, 0.2 and 3.4 m/s
(corresponding exit
diameters are 46, 33 and 8
mm respectively) there
was a moderate variation
in the horizontal hydrogen
diffusion along the bottom
surface and in the lift of the
4%+ combustible mixture
1 g/min is considered to be
the maximum escape
volume of hydrogen in the
event of a fault.
0,5 g/s concerns less
severe cases. Hydrogen is
stored under cryogenic
form. These values are
based on hydrogen boil off.
No indication given on why
these data have been
chosen.
Table 2: Hydrogen leak cases in confined spaces
extracted from the literature
Compared with existing experiments and data, DRIVE
will investigate wider leak rates and release conditions
spectrum with more elaborate measurement techniques,
in terms of gas concentration and velocity and
turbulence measurements. The new tests will be the
most detailed and finely instrumented tests for the study
of hydrogen leaks. The objective is clearly to produce
data both for risk assessment purpose, and to validate
CFD tools, which are now well recognised to be
potentially the most accurate and reliable computational
tool for assessing consequences of accident scenarios.
TOOLS
The development of a full-scale garage and a quasi non-
intrusive (due to their small size) sensor network
(catharometric measurement type) is currently in
progress. Mass flow controller of various ranges will be
used in order to control leak flow. Hydrogen or helium
concentration will be measured with the help of the
catharometric sensors grid. Non intrusive velocimetry
measurements will be undertaken through particle image
velocimetry (PIV) and Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV).
Transparent walls will be mounted on the garage to
allow measurements. Ventilation will be managed with
the help of either an extractor or a fan. The dimensions
of the garage are those of a typical European garage for
a single vehicle, and it is fitted with an overhead pivoting
door. The garage will be fitted with vents which can
provide either passive or active ventilation or extraction.
Computational Fluid Dynamics tools will be used for pre-
test calculations, as well as to analyse the tests once the
CFD codes have been completely validated. One of the
CFD outputs that will be of most use for safety
assessment is the time-evolution of the volume of
explosive atmosphere (for example the volume of gas
mixtures above 4% of H2). The effect of leak location,
direction, impingement on nearby obstacles as well as
presence or absence of ventilation on the evolution of
this cloud will be investigated in detail.
Length (m)
Width (m)
High(m)
Volume (m3)
External
dimensions
5.84
3.04
2.5
44.88
Internal
dimensions
5.76
2.69
2.42
41.26
Figure 2: Garage skeleton (top) and garage dimensions
(bottom)
EARLY RESULTS
The first tests are scheduled in the second semester of
2006, and will first address simple release scenarios
with no obstacles and then release scenarios with a
vehicle mock-up. Extensive work is under way to build
and test the experimental set up, as well as to test and
calibrate the sensors, both under air/helium and
air/hydrogen flows.
HYDROGEN IGNITION BY VEHICLE
COMPONENTS
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this work is to assess the ignition
potential of some of the electrical and mechanical
components and to identify best practices for the design
and the positioning of vehicle components.
STEPS
Though not applicable to vehicles, the same strategy as
the one of the ATEX 94/9CE [9] & ATEX 99/92CE [10]
is followed. Basically, it consists in demonstrating that
components have no ignition potential under normal
circumstances whenever an explosive atmosphere can
form accidentally.
The first step therefore consists in listing mechanical and
electrical components in the vicinity of hydrogen
systems. Then, some of them will be selected to
undertake ignition tests in dedicated chambers. Based
on results, recommendations will be made regarding the
design and the location of the components.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In the course of this project, we have been looking at
cross-experiences from natural gas vehicles (NGV) as
well as from industrial vehicles that could accidentally
drive into an explosive atmosphere (fork lift trucks).
Regarding NGV vehicles, no recommendation at all is
found regarding protection or segregation of electrical
equipment [11]. As far as forklift trucks are concerned
(category 3 vehicle for type 2 zone), the EN 1755 [12]
standard gives a few hints which include:
• minimum distance to prevent mechanical frictions or
limit speed at which friction can occur (brakes,
clutch,...),
• bounding of all mechanical parts to ensure same
electric potential,
• enclosing of electrical equipment to limit combustible
gas ingress whenever the forklift drives through an
explosive cloud,
• installing gas detection onboard forklift truck. A 10%
LFL concentration triggers an alarm. A 25% LFL
concentration stops the forklift,
• and also, limiting maximum surface temperatures
when in use.
Now, looking at GRPE [3] latest draft provisions, one
could notice quite a few recommendations on electrical
equipment. That includes:
• preventing hydrogen ingress into power supply
connections where hydrogen leaks are possible
(paragraph 14.11.4.),
• providing sufficient insulation of electrical
components to ensure that no current passes
through hydrogen containing parts (paragraph 6.5.1)
• & ensuring that electrical connections and
components in the gas tight housing are constructed
such that no sparks are generated (paragraph
14.10.3.)
TOOLS
Tests will be carried out inside an explosion chamber
dedicated to test electrical or mechanical equipment.
The picture below features a typical test chamber.
Figure 3: Front view of a typical test chamber to test
ignition potential of equipment
EARLY RESULTS
So far, the following components have been selected for
practical testing:
• the hydrogen compartment fan,
• the electric motor that drives the vehicle,
• the electrical converter,
• and the braking system.
Moreover, some non-conductive material components
have been selected in order to check whether or not
they can lead to an electrostatic ignition hazard.
Regarding early recommendations for the design of
vehicle components in order to control ignition sources
in normal use, the following can be proposed so far:
Compon
ent
Braking
system
Fans
Sparkles
s drive
motors
Referen
ces
EN
1755
[12]
EN
50021
[13]
EN
50021
[13]
State of the art design to control of ignition sources
Blocks should be made of a combination of non-
metallic materials and cast iron or an equivalent
material. Light alloys are not allowed. Non-
metallic materials should not contain more than
40% metal in weight and should be made of
powder or fine wires (sizes given in standard).
Blocks should be glued or pressed on brake
shoes. Holes or assembly should not be found
on friction surfaces,
Temperature should be monitored,
And wear should be checked.
IP10 rating (IP:Protection Index for water and
dust penetration),on the output side and IP 20
rating on the input side,
Distances between moving and fixed parts
greater than 1/100 of the fan diameter (at least
between 1 and 5 mm),
3,5 J shock test without hazardous deformation
(or 2 J if fans are physically protected against
shocks).
IP 54 rating,
Dielectric strength test to ensure sufficient
electric isolation,
Expectations on electrical couplings,
Minimum distance between rotor and stator to
be implemented.
Table 3: State of the art design to control ignition
sources for some key components
HYDROGEN COMBUSTION
OBJECTIVE
This work aims at defining maximum tolerable explosive
volumes for various leakage environments and providing
straightforward pressure/effect prediction rules for risk
assessment. Test results will also be useful to evaluate
the prediction potential of CFD tools.
STEPS
This experimental programme will first investigate
pressure effects caused by the ignition of moderate and
calibrated explosive volumes for various levels of
confinement from free environment up to congested
environment similar to those we can find onboard
vehicles. Pressure prediction rules will be derived from
these early tests. Then explosions will be carried out
onboard vehicle following leakage flows and locations
consistent with those found in the earlier work
programme. These tests will also help us to evaluate the
destructive potential of onboard vehicle explosions.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Although not wanted, leaks will inevitably occur onboard
vehicles. It is therefore a necessity to work on a
maximum allowable explosive volume with tolerable
associated effects. Once this limit is set, it will be a
significant input to size safety barriers for leak detection
and interruption. So far, the only "tolerable explosive
volume" we found come from the industry. The
European guide document for the implementation of
ATEX 99/92CE directive [10] indicates, independently of
the combustible gas considered that:
• an unconfined explosive atmosphere should always
be considered hazardous when its volume is above
10 litres,
• and an explosive atmosphere in a closed room
should always be considered hazardous when its
volume is greater than 1/10 000 of the room volume.
Other work [15] investigated the limit of acceptable
explosive volumes in natural gas turbine casings. The
recommended safety criterion is that the natural gas
flammable cloud volume should be less than 0.1% of the
net enclosure volume. In addition to the above condition
on the allowable size of a flammable gas cloud relative
to the net enclosure volume, the flammable gas cloud
volume should also be less than 1 m3 in all cases,
irrespective of the enclosure volume. Safety systems
have to be designed (detection, ventilation) in order to
insure that these limits are never exceeded. One should
mention that people would not be present inside the
enclosure volume but are expected to stand nearby.
Proposed acceptable explosive volumes are not
susceptible to cause casing rupture and blast injuries.
Examples above illustrated confined and unconfined
explosions as well as explosion with and without direct
exposure of people. These various cases will be taken
into consideration.
Regarding existing data on explosion experiments for
moderate and calibrated explosion volumes in more or
less confined environment, the review has not yet
started. However, similar experiments will be carried out
by FZK3 in the framework of the HySafe network.
For explosion onboard vehicles, we can mention
experiments carried out by the Motor Vehicle Fire
Research Institute USA [8] where they investigated
hydrogen leakage in the engine compartment. They
investigated various release rate and ignition delay.
Test showed that the maximum engine compartment
overpressure was 220 mbar. This maximum
overpressure that caused the hood to bend was
obtained for a 64 sec release of 51 g of hydrogen.
Shorter released produced overpressure of 10 mbar to
152 mbar.
TOOLS
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe
These tests are planed for 2007. The experimental set
up has not been designed yet. Tests will most probably
be combined with those undertaken by FZK in the
framework of the HySafe network.
HYDROGEN FLAME
OBJECTIVE
This work aims on one hand at providing data on
hydrogen flame length and on hydrogen flame radiation
for some severe scenarios (significant leak under the
hood, hydrogen escaping through the thermal fuse).
Besides these tests, less severe cases will be
investigated in order to study conditions under which a
hydrogen flame cannot be sustained. Ease of ignition
shall also be investigated for high and moderate
pressures with various leak orifices. These latter cases
address minor / non detectable leakage that do not
cause any explosion hazard but could however cause a
significant fire hazard whenever the vehicle is parked or
driven.
STEPS
The work programme includes both an experimental and
a numerical part. The first step will consist in selecting a
set of realistic scenarios/situations to be investigated.
The experimental set up for flame length and flame
radiation has not yet been designed. Regarding flame
length, both free and impinged jets will be looked at.
Seeding will probably be used to visualise flames. As far
as micro leaks are concerned, we will look at leak
orifices most probably below 1 mm for various values of
pressure.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
It has been established experimentally that hydrogen
discharges through circular orifices larger than a critical
diameter sustains stable lifted flames irrespective of the
reservoir pressure driving the release. At smaller
diameter however, stable burning will only be achieved
at operating pressures higher than a particular,
diameter-dependant threshold [16].
Regarding vehicle related literature contributions, we
can mention two practical contributions to the topic. First
of all, we can mention the experimental work from the
Motor Vehicle Fire Research Institute USA [8] where jet
flames in the engine compartment have been
investigated. Some more data was previously released
by the Japan Automobile Research Institute [7]. JARI
compared for a given leakage rate (11.8 g/min for
hydrogen and 28.6 g/min for natural gas/methane)
critical diameter under which a gas flame was not
sustained. They found out that the methane flame
became no more viable with a rather large diameter of
2.00 mm or less. On the other hand, the hydrogen flame
was sustained at the leak orifice even with a nozzle
diameter of 1.0 mm. Authors concluded that the
favourable stability of hydrogen flames is advantageous
as a means to avoid explosion. Needless to say that the
1 mm orifice considered is rather large. Much smaller
leak orifice could be expected without being noticed.
They could eventually cause a fire hazard. It is therefore
necessary to investigate leak orifices smaller than 1 mm.
The DRIVE project will investigate these situations.
Moreover, this research institute also investigated the
flame behaviour of hydrogen released from 350 bar
hydrogen tanks. They found out that the hydrogen flame
released upwards reached its maximum height of 7-8
meters in 5 to 10 seconds. This flame length is very
significant and could cause severe hazards for cars
occupants as well as for rescue services. It is therefore
of a prime importance to provide advice on how this
release should be dealt with (upward, downward under
the vehicle...). The DRIVE project will also address this
issue within this work programme.
RESULTS AND DISSEMINATION
The DRIVE project aims at investigating experimentally
and numerically hydrogen vehicle related accidental
scenarios in order to strengthen risk assessment as well
as to promote safe hydrogen handling solution onboard
vehicle. Three documents will be produced:
• the first one will address hazard quantification
results and hazard quantification tools for hydrogen
vehicles. Hazardous phenomena will be explained.
Issues such as flame length or explosive
atmosphere volume versus pressure and diameter
will be detailed,
• the second one will address best practices when
using CFD tools to predict hydrogen behaviour when
released accidentally or under normal situation,
• and the final one will address best practices when
handling hydrogen onboard vehicles. Its content will
include both generic risk assessment as well as best
practices for the design of hydrogen vehicles.
These results will be presented in the course of open
seminars.
CONCLUSIONS
Field of investigation covers the all range of phenomena
that can be encountered in hydrogen accidents from
leakage, to dispersion, ignition and finally combustion.
This programme aims at providing experimental and
numerical results in order to provide realistic risk
assessment and to be able to specify precisely expected
hydrogen vehicles safety performances. DRIVE outputs
will be turned into practical graphs to facilitate risk
quantification. Recommendations on best practice
vehicle design will also be drafted. Actually, topics such
as maximum allowable explosive volume, control of
ignition sources and location of hydrogen components
will be addressed.
This project has just started. However preliminary
reviews of existing experimental data and guidelines
have been performed, to better define the expected
results of the project. These reviews and early thoughts
and findings represent important contributions to the
elaboration of safety guidelines for hydrogen vehicles.
We can without any doubt consider today that DRIVE
outputs will be of a great help for designing safe
hydrogen vehicles.
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